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Abstract
In March 2020, shelter-in-place and social-distancing policies have been enforced or recom-
mended all over the world to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. However, strict containment is
hardly achievable in low-income countries, as large parts of population are forced to continue
income-generating activities to escape extreme poverty or hunger. To assess the trade-off
between poverty and a higher risk of catching COVID-19, we use regional mobility to work
and poverty rates across 241 regions of 9 countries from Latin America and Africa. With
a difference-in-difference approach around the time of lockdown announcements, we mea-
sure the differential time variation in work mobility between high and low-poverty regions.
We find that the degree of work mobility reduction is significantly driven by the intensity
of poverty. Consistently, human movements vary significantly more between poverty levels
when it come to work rather than less vital activities. We also estimate how higher poverty
rates translate into a faster spread of COVID-19 cases through the channel of work mobility.
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“At the same time while dealing with a COVID-19 pandemic, we are also on the brink of a
hunger pandemic.” (David Beasley, UN World Food Programme Executive Director).1
1 Introduction
With the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, shelter-in-place and social-distancing
policies have been put in place around the world. In the absence of vaccine, such measures
remain crucial to stop the spread of the virus. However, unlike in richer parts of the world,
the effectiveness and socio-economic consequences of stringent confinement policies are largely
being questioned in the context of low-income countries (Ravallion, 2020, Mobarak and Barnett-
Howell, 2020, Piper, 2020). One of the central concerns, among other burning aspects such
as fragile healthcare systems, is that a large part of the population of poor countries works
in uncovered informal sectors and is reliant on daily hands-on labor income, which is hardly
attainable under strict self-isolation requirements (Robalino, 2020). Unless proper safety nets
are ensured, poor people in developing countries cannot afford to stay at home and to follow
confinement policies simply due to the urgency to feed themselves and their families.2 Yet, there
are almost no empirical studies investigating the effect of poverty on compliance with public
health recommendations across developing countries in the time of a global pandemic.
Against this background, we measure how daily mobility to work has changed after the im-
plementation of lockdown policies in Latin America and Africa depending on the local level of
poverty. To do so, we combine Google COVID-19 mobility reports and comprehensive poverty
statistics at the sub-national level, i.e. across 241 regions of 9 countries from Latin America
and Africa, over a period of 71 days starting from February 16, 2020. To measure the effect of
poverty on compliance with confinement policies, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach
around the time of lockdown announcements to quantify how the time change in work mobility
differs across regional poverty levels. We use the daily panel of regions to account for regional
fixed effects, which capture fundamental differences across regions (differences in healthcare
capacities, local culture or perception about COVID-19, or the timing of the epidemic such as
the date of first contaminations).3
Our analysis reveals that the decline in work mobility after lockdown is significantly lower in
regions with higher poverty rates, i.e. these poorer regions comply less with shelter-in-place
policies. This poverty effect is significantly stronger for work mobility compared to other activ-
1See World Food Programme (2020) for a full statement to UN Security Council.
2The issue has been raised also in the context of developed countries, like the US where a significant inequality
in income levels still persists and makes that US counties with lower levels of per capita income record lower level
of compliance with stay-at-home orders (Wright et al., 2020)
3Note that mobile phone tracking has already been used for gauging the mobility impact of travel restrictions,
for instance during the unprecedented measures put in place to eliminate Ebola in 2015 (Peak et al., 2018, for
Sierra Leone). Google reports are also currently used to check how mobility and poverty correlate at country
level analysis (UNDP, 2020). Yet, many other dimensions vary across countries that may confound the effect of
poverty. This justifies the approach suggested in the paper using region x day variation and double difference
analysis.
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ities. In simple terms, poorer people are less likely to comply with self-isolation requirements
and stay at home, but more likely to continue their labor activities by commuting to their work-
places. Our results provide a solid empirical evidence that poor people in developing part of the
world cannot afford to follow confinement policies as much as non-poor people, roughly due to
the hardest choice they face during the time of pandemic between risking to catch COVID-19
or falling in extreme poverty. Finally, we estimate the effect of reduced mobility on the spread
of COVID-19 and, subsequently, on how the effect of poverty on mobility translates into higher
regional epidemic growth rates. One standard-deviation above the mean regional poverty is
associated with 11% more cases after a month and a half.
2 Data Sources
To analyze the impact of poverty on mobility and, then, on the spread of COVID-19, we
mobilize several types of data: the Google mobility index, poverty data from various sources,
and information on the local numbers of daily cases of COVID-19.
2.1 Mobility
We use daily human mobility data from Google COVID-19 mobility reports, which aggregate
anonymized sets of data from users’ mobile device Location History. These reports record
percent changes in the number of visits or length of stay at various locations compared to a
reference period of January 3 – February 6, 2020.4 There are six location categories: (i) retail
and recreation, (ii) grocery and pharmacy, (iii) parks (public gardens, dog parks, beaches, etc.),
(iv) transit stations (public transport hubs such as subway, bus, train stations), (v) workplaces,
and (vi) residential areas. Human mobility is tracked by Google daily and in a consistent manner
across 131 countries for a period of 71 days from February 16 to April 26, 2020. For a subset
of countries, the information is provided at sub-national level. We focus on the countries for
which regional mobility is available in Africa (Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa) and Latin
America (Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia).
The original data is provided in percent changes with respect to average mobility in the reference
period. For a matter of convenience, we transform the percent changes into an index on a 0-100
scale, where the reference mobility intensity takes the value of 100. For example, a work-related
mobility value of 85 for the governorate of Cairo on March 20 corresponds to a 15 percent
decrease in mobility for this type of activity and this location compared to the reference level.
Figure 1 illustrates work mobility using country mean levels (similar trends are obtained with
other mobility categories). The horizontal axis represents the February 16-April 26 periods
with March 1 taken as day 0. The calls for self-isolation were made around March 16-20 in
Latin American countries, slightly later in African countries. We observe a decline in mobility
in all countries, with a sharp drop in most cases and more progressive trends in some countries
4See: https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/
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Figure 1: National Trends in Mobility to Work.
(Kenya, Nigeria or Mexico). Note that the cross-country variance in mobility is relatively small
before the lockdown period and increases enormously afterwards due to the variety of country
responses. The plateau level reached by mobility curves in late March and April varies with
national policies, from strict official lockdown to mild mitigations policies (e.g. in Brazil and
Mexico). Note that different rates of change in mobility reflect several factors including national
lockdown stringencies and spontaneous behavior, possibly in relation with local factors such as
poverty.
2.2 Poverty
We combine mobility data with poverty rates at regional level. Poverty is measured as headcount
ratios (the share of people living below national or international poverty lines in the region).
We rely on relatively recent datasets and use regional poverty measures provided by statistical
offices or, when missing (Nigeria and South Africa), based on our own calculations using publicly
available household surveys. Datasets and methodological choices are explained in much detail
in Table A.1 in the appendix. All poverty measures rely on per capita income or consumption.
Poverty thresholds are either the standard World Bank international poverty lines (for different
income groups of countries) or national definitions based on the value of a basic bundle of goods
(or basic food basket, for extreme poverty).
Our results are not very dependent on these methodological choices (notably the choice of
poverty line) because our difference-in-difference approach essentially compares regional time
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variation in poverty (controlling for region fixed effects) rather that differences in absolute
poverty levels across regions, as explained in the empirical approach hereafter. We will nonethe-
less check our main results when using alternative poverty lines, namely extreme poverty rather
than moderate poverty. Our estimations use poverty headcount ratios directly (as a continuous
measure of poverty intensity at regional level) or discretized versions. A binary poverty measure
is taking value one if regional poverty headcount ratio is above the country average of regional
poverty rates, and zero otherwise. Tercile measures are a set of dummy variables defining lev-
els of regional poverty as low (below 25th percentile of regional poverty rate within country),
medium (between 25th-75th percentiles) and high (above 75th percentile). Binary and tercile
measures are convenient for graphical representations and will also be used in the estimations.
2.3 COVID-19 cases
After combining mobility and poverty data, our final sample (with non-missing values on key
variables) includes 241 regions in 9 countries from Latin America and Africa over a period of
71 days starting from February 16, 2020. Note that our estimations will include robustness
checks whereby the (one-day lagged) number of new COVID-19 cases is included. Also, we
ultimately assess how poverty reflects on the growth rate of COVID-19. For both purposes, we
use the daily updates of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) on
the number of COVID-19 cases by country.
3 Empirical Approaches and Results
3.1 Graphical Evidence
We start with a visual examination of regional mobility patterns by levels of poverty across
regions in our sample, focusing on the whole period of available data (February 16 to April
26, 2020).5 In Figure 2, we illustrate regional mobility trends for work-related locations, i.e.
the type of mobility for which we expect the largest impact of poverty. Each graph represents
the daily average mobility over all the regions in our sample. We use a local polynomial fit
of the daily variation across regions and its 95% confidence interval (CI). The horizontal axis
represents dates with March 1 taken as day 0. Here we use terciles of poverty, splitting regions
in three groups of low, medium and high poverty levels as defined above. The vertical dashed
line represents the average lockdown date in the countries covered in our sample.
5Because of the level of trade with China, Egypt and South Africa were the countries at highest importation
risk in Africa, as estimated using destination air travel flows (Gilbert et al., 2020). Africa confirmed its first case
in Egypt on Feb 14, 2020.
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Figure 2: Mobility to Workplaces by Levels of Regional Poverty.
Figure 3: Mobility to Workplaces versus Other Locations by Poverty Groups.
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Consider the first graph of the figure. We see that mobility fluctuates around 100 in late
February/early March, i.e. around the same level as in the reference period (Jan. 3 - Feb.
6). Most importantly, the different poverty groups show very similar mobility patterns during
this early stage, both in trends and levels (differences are often not statistically significant).
Following lockdown measures or recommendations, the drop in mobility is significantly more
pronounced for low-poverty regions. This pattern constitutes our main result. It is verified
using binary poverty (unreported) or in the more detailed representation of Figure 2 with three
poverty groups, showing a monotonic relationship between poverty levels and mobility decline.
The second and third graphs focus on each continent separately. Comparing both graphs, we
see that the overall mobility reduction is smaller in Africa (between 30% and 40%) compare
to Latin America (more than 40%), which suggests the role of poverty differences at a broader
scale. Also, differences between high and low poverty regions are more pronounced within the
African sample, which possibly denotes more regional dispersion in living standards in Africa
and/or more differences in behavioral responses across African regions. In all the graphs, these
gaps between poverty groups remain noticeable until the end of the observation period (26th of
April).
With rare exceptions, a similar pattern is found when looking at each country separately – see
Figure A.1 in the appendix. The monotonic ranking between high, medium and low poverty re-
gions in mobility changes is observed almost everywhere, with statistically significant differences
at least between high and low poverty regions. Only exceptions concern two Latin American
countries, Brazil and Mexico. The explanation may pertain to specific situations in countries
where populist presidents from the right (Brazil) or left (Mexico) deny the seriousness of the
pandemic (Blofield et al., 2020). While subnational and other authorities seek to fill the lead-
ership vacuum, policy implementation is harmed and self-containment is low for both the rich
and the poor.6
We also check whether results are sensitive to the definition of poverty at country level. To
consider a large change in poverty line, we consider the extreme poverty measures (see Table
A.1 for methodological detail). We replicate our approach while grouping regions according
to their position in their national distribution of regional ‘extreme poverty’ rates, namely with
low (below 25th percentile), medium (between 25th-75th percentiles) and high (above 75th
percentile) groups. Figure A.2 shows very similar patterns compared to the previous results:
the drop in mobility levels during lockdown decreases with the regional rate of extreme poverty.
Finally, in Figure 3, we compare the patterns of workplace mobility with other mobility cate-
gories. For the sake of clarity, we distinguish only two poverty groups (high/low) but conclusions
are identical with three. For all mobility types we observe similar trends over the complete pe-
riod. Yet the difference between high- and low-poverty groups is much larger for work-related
mobility in comparison to other mobility types. This result suggests that less spontaneous con-
6In these countries, work mobility levels are actually the highest among the Latin American countries repre-
sented in Figure A.1, as also seen in Figure 1.
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tainment – or less compliance to lockdown policies – among the poorest is mostly driven by
life-and-death motives which force them to continue income-related activities during the lock-
down period. A final remark is that mobility reductions are highest for non-essential activities
(recreation and transits) and smallest for going to the grocery/pharmacy, while work mobility
is somewhat intermediary.
3.2 Difference-in-difference panel estimations
Given the graphical evidence above, we proceed with econometric estimations aimed to formally
test these behavioral differences across regions of different poverty intensity.
Difference-in-difference approach. We adopt a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to
estimate the effect of poverty on mobility trends during the COVID-19 pandemic. Estimations
are conducted on our panel of regions × days over the period from March 1 to April 26. Precisely,
we regress mobility of type j in region i on day t as follows:
Mobilityjit = α+ γPostt × Povertyi + µi + θt + εit (1)
Recall that calls for lockdown have taken place in a narrow interval around March 20 so that we
use this average lockdown date as the cutoff to determine the ‘treatment’ period, i.e. formally,
we note Postt = 1(t > March 20).
7 For the interaction term, Povertyi is the headcount ratio
(continuous version) or a dummy variable indicating if regional poverty is above the national
average. We will also use interactions of Postt with high and medium poverty (low poverty
being the reference group) for the tercile version.8 Coefficient γ is the DiD estimator, represent-
ing the effect of higher poverty on mobility during lockdown compared to low poverty regions
before lockdown. Day dummies θt capture common time trends (for instance the information
available to everyone on the pandemic situation at any point in time). Region dummies µi
account, among other things, for regional and national disparities in the overall contagion level
or in local levels of policy stringencies, for different national health systems or local health-
care capacities, or for persistent regional characteristics (including long-term labor market and
economic characteristics determining local standards of living).
Main results. Difference-in-difference estimates for work-related activities are reported in Ta-
ble 1.9 We start with binary poverty. Consistent with the graphical analysis, estimates of γ
7The results that follow are similar when starting the period of observation on Feb. 16 rather than March 1, or
when using alternative definitions of Postt. For the latter, we have experimented with earlier dates (corresponding
to international announcement of the pandemic situation), continent-specific dates (Africa or Latin America
average dates of lockdown calls) or country-specific dates (using announcement dates of strict lockdown policies
or of recommendations at national or sub-national levels, as reported at: www.bbc.com/news/world-52103747).
Some of these sensitivity checks are presented hereafter.
8Note that Povertyi does not appear in equation (1) as it is treated as a constant regional characteristic for
the few weeks of interest, hence absorbed by region fixed effects µi. Similarly, Postt is absorbed by day dummies
θt.
9Note that the validity of the DiD approach requires that for the groups of different ‘treatment’ intensity,








(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Binary Poverty
Post x Poverty 4.035*** 4.018*** 4.033*** 3.331*** 6.643*** 3.509*** 4.187***
(0.512) (0.500) (0.500) (0.528) (0.584) (0.570) (0.655)
R-squared 0.766 0.806 0.806 0.812 0.773 0.885 0.884
Terciles of Poverty
Post x Moderate Poverty 4.079*** 4.070*** 4.077*** 4.395*** 6.149*** 3.423*** 3.964***
(0.615) (0.606) (0.606) (0.640) (0.708) (0.723) (0.822)
Post x High Poverty 7.819*** 7.798*** 7.798*** 7.447*** 10.816*** 5.972*** 7.353***
(0.709) (0.700) (0.699) (0.745) (0.813) (0.808) (0.927)
R-squared 0.769 0.807 0.807 0.813 0.775 0.885 0.885
Regional Poverty Rate (Continuous)
Post x Poverty 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.345*** 0.302*** 0.194*** 0.071*** 0.236***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.023)
R-squared 0.787 0.823 0.823 0.824 0.781 0.884 0.886
Observations 13,664 13,664 13,664 13,664 6,140 7,524 5,985
Day Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes No No No No No No
Region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cumulated COVID-19 cases No No Yes No No No No
Region reweighting No No No Yes No No No
Mean Mobility (0-100) 74.9 74.9 74.9 73.3 82.8 68.5 65.8
Mean Poverty (%) 38.3 38.3 38.3 38.3 49.6 29.1 32.6
% change in work mobility for:
+1 % increase in poverty (elast) 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.12
+1 std. dev. in poverty 10.39 10.39 10.90 9.75 6.37 1.54 5.97
% change in upcoming C-19 cases growth rate for:
+1 % increase in poverty (elast) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.06
+1 std. dev. in poverty 4.91 4.91 5.15 4.61 3.01 0.73 2.82
Note: Authors’ estimation using Google reports for workplace mobility and regional poverty rates (from national statistics or authors’ estima-
tions as described in Table A.1) for the period March 1-April 26, 2020. Post is a dummy indicating the period starting March 20, 2020 (average
lockdown date). Continuous poverty is the percent of people in the region living below the poverty line. Binary poverty measure corresponds
to a dummy indicating if the region’s poverty rate is above country average regional poverty rate. Moderate (high) poverty dummies indicate if
regional poverty rate is between 25th-75th percentile (above 75th percentile) of regional poverty rates within country. Robustness checks include
cumulated number of COVID-19 cases as control (taken from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) and region reweighting
(observations are weighted by 1 over the # of regions in the corresponding country). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: Effect of Poverty on Mobility
confirm that work-related mobility is significantly higher in regions with higher poverty rates
during the lockdown period relative to low-poverty regions in the preceding period. It can be
interpreted as lower levels of compliance with national stay-at-home orders during the pandemic
due to the necessity to work. The magnitude of the effect is around 4 points of mobility (on
the 0-100 scale), which represents 4% of the pre-lockdown mobility among low-poverty regions
or 6.6% of the overall mobility after March 20. We consider several specifications that all yield
very similar estimates in that order of magnitude. First, model (A) controls for day dummies
and country fixed effects. Model (B) corresponds to our main specification, i.e. the panel DiD
as laid out in equation (1). As explained, it includes region fixed effects that capture local (time-
invariant) unobserved heterogeneity, including the persistent determinants of poverty. Model
(C) additionally controls for the cumulative number of reported COVID-19 cases at national
level on t− 1. It represents the objective risk of contagion and the urgency to comply with con-
above, namely that groups of regions have common mobility trends (and even show very similar mobility levels).
Formal tests confirm it. We estimate equation (1) on the period from February 16 to March 10 (beginning of the
drop in Mobility) for different values of Postt in this interval and find no effect of regional poverty on mobility.
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tainment measures, which might alter individual mobility behavior.10 Another potential issue
is that pooling countries with varying number of regions may result in larger weight attached
to a country with numerous regions. To avoid this, Model (D) checks the sensitivity of model
(B)’s estimates to reweighting each observation by the inverse of the number of regions in the
corresponding country. The coefficient of interest slightly falls in magnitude but is still positive
and significant.
Models (E) and (F) report results of regressions analogous to model (B), but separately for
African and Latin American countries. Consistently with Figure 2, and as could be expected,
there is a stronger mobility effect of poverty in Africa compared to Latin America. In the last
column, model (G) excludes Brazil which was found to be an outlier among Latin American
countries in the graphical analysis (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). The coefficient for Latin
America excluding Brazil increases slightly.
The next rows of Table 1 convey that conclusions are similar using alternative poverty outcomes.
The tercile approach shows a monotonic pattern: mobility reduction due to containment is
around 7.8 points smaller in high poverty regions and 4 points smaller in moderate poverty
regions compared to low poverty regions. Then, using directly the regional headcount ratio
allows using the complete variation in poverty intensity across regions. The estimate means
that an additional percentage point in the regional poverty rate is associated with a mobility
that is around 0.33 point larger during lockdown. For 1 standard deviation in regional poverty
rate (23.6 points), the mobility differential is around 7.8, which is similar to the gap between
low and high poverty regions in our tercile approach.
At the bottom of Table 1, we provide elasticity estimates for the effect of poverty on mobility,
and ultimately on the growth rate of COVID-19 cases (the latter is discussed in the next section).
We calculate mobility elasticities as a one percent or a one standard deviation departure from
the mean of regional poverty (equal to 38.3 percent) but similar results are obtained using a
log-log specification of equation (1). For instance, with the baseline model (B), a 1% (resp. 1
standard deviation) increase in regional poverty leads to a 0.17% (resp. 10.4%) increase in work
mobility.
Sensitivity checks. We provide further sensitivity analyses in appendix Table A.2. We first
report DiD estimates based on the same approach as above but changing the time cutoff to
March 11, 2020, which is the date when WHO declared COVID-19 as a global pandemic.
With this definition of Postt, we obtain very similar estimates compared to the baseline. The
second set of results is based on alternative definitions of poverty. Given that DiD estimates are
identified by comparing relative changes in regional poverty over time, we expect methodological
aspects surrounding poverty calculations not to alter our conclusions too much. To experiment
10Note that alternative estimations using the number of new cases or the cumulated number of deaths lead to
similar results (significant estimates of 4.038 and 4.012 respectively). Since the perception of the situation may
vary across regions, we also interact the number of cases with region dummies µi, which yields estimates that
are slightly larger but in the same order of magnitude (4.421 using cumulated cases and 5.063 using new cases).
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with a substantial change in poverty line, we consider extreme poverty (it essentially boils down
to using the World Bank PPP $1.9 poverty line rather than higher national or international
thresholds as described in Table A.1). Regarding the average effect over all countries (models
A-D), results are indeed very close to the baseline. Consistently with the graphical analysis of
Figure A.2, we see a large effect of extreme poverty in Africa and a more modest effect for Latin
American countries.
Alternative mobility indices. We compare the effect of poverty across different types of
mobility to check whether non-compliance of poor people with confinement policies are mostly
due to the urgency to meet their basic life needs through daily earnings. We estimate our
baseline model (DiD with region and time fixed effects) using binary poverty and, as outcome,
work mobility or three other types of mobility: retail and recreation, grocery and pharmacy, and
transit stations. Results are reported in Table 2. The estimates show that the effect of poverty
is positive on other types of mobility, but most importantly, it is the largest for work-related
mobility. This result is consistent with Figure 3. It also seems intuitive that the largest effect
among other activities pertains to time spent in transports (transit stations), as it is partly
related to work behavior. The formal tests of equality of the coefficients confirm that the effect
of poverty is significantly larger for mobility to workplaces, compared to the other three types
of mobility (the equality of coefficients is rejected with a p-value close to zero in all three cases).
These results confirm that poorer people tend to exhibit lower compliance with self-isolation









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Poverty (bin.) 4.018*** 0.821 1.490*** 2.086***
(0.500) (0.673) (0.559) (0.655)
P-value: coef. equal to that of Work 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 13,664 12,506 12,173 11,359
R-squared 0.806 0.838 0.846 0.722
Note: Authors’ estimation using Google reports for workplace mobility and regional poverty rates
(from national statistics or authors’ estimations as described in Table A1) for the period March 1-
April 26, 2020. Post is a dummy indicating the period starting March 20, 2020 (average lockdown
date). All estimations include region fixed effects and day fixed effects. Poverty (bin.) is a dummy
indicating if region’s poverty rate is above national average regional poverty rate (the percent of
people in the region living below national/international poverty lines). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Effect of Poverty on Mobility, by Mobility types
Limitations and discussion. We discuss potential limitations regarding the use of Google
COVID-19 reports to measure human mobility at regional level. Admittedly, mobility data is
possibly biased towards more educated and wealthier parts of the population who are more
likely to own a smartphone and use the Internet (Ballivian et al., 2015). Yet, Google Location
History (GLH) data is available from an increasingly large proportion of the world, as the
Android user base has increased dramatically since 2012, reaching over 3 billion active devices
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in 2020. Moreover, though being still lower than in advanced economies, the rates of smartphone
ownership and internet usage in emerging economies have rapidly increased in the recent years
(International Telecommunication Union, 2019). In particular, for the countries included in our
sample, the latest reported statistics for national mobile penetration rates – subscriptions to
cellular services per 100 people – show that access to mobile services is considerably high, with
an average of 115 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (see Table A.3 in the appendix).
This reassures us that Google mobility data may still represent large parts of population in the
countries covered in our analysis. Furthermore, GLH data is argued to be a promising source of
mobility data for a better understanding of daily human movement in low- and middle-income
settings where Android devices are increasingly popular as an affordable way to access the
Internet (Ruktanonchai et al., 2018). In our analysis, we try to compare mobility across regions
with different levels of poverty. Thus, in regions with a low poverty rate, GLH information
is likely to capture most of the regional population while in regions with high poverty rates,
there is a bias towards the less poor segment of the local population. In this scenario, the
difference between a higher level of mobility (lower compliance) among the poor and a lower
mobility (higher compliance) of the non-poor during lockdown is likely to be underestimated in
our approach. Yet, the effect of poverty on mobility that we estimate in the presence of such
potential bias can still serve as a lower bound, which is enough to underline that poverty is one
of the important determinants of compliance with containment policies in developing countries.
3.3 Implications for the Spread of COVID-19 in Africa and Latin America
Finally, we attempt to provide suggestive evidence on how poverty translates into a higher
spread of COVID-19 through increased work mobility in Latin America and Africa. Note that
the following calculations are purely indicative. Hereafter, we use daily mobility data and the
cumulative number of reported COVID-19 cases for the period from March 20-April 26, 2020.
We first establish how the upcoming growth rate of COVID-19 responds to the instantaneous
mobility index, reflecting time and spatial variation in lockdown policies and behavior. For each
day, we compare the current cumulated number of reported COVID-19 cases to that of 2 weeks
ahead, and divide the corresponding growth rate by 14 to obtain an average daily growth rate
of upcoming COVID-19 cases. This rate implicitly incorporates the exponential nature of the
COVID-19 diffusion and the way it is affected by local self-isolation behavior. The link between
mobility and this upcoming growth rate is illustrated in Figure 4: lower levels of work-related
mobility are associated with lower rates of future cases.
To calculate an elasticity, we regress upcoming growth rates on mobility, day dummies and
region fixed effects. In a set of alternative specifications, we find significant estimates ranging
between 0.0015 and 0.0018. Given a mean mobility index of 59.9 over this period, and an
average daily epidemic growth rate of 0.22 (a doubling in the number of cases in less than 5
days on average), these estimates yield an elasticity of around 0.40-0.47. That is, a 10% increase
in mobility leads to a 4%-4.7% increase in the epidemic growth rate (a 0.9-1.1 percentage point
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Figure 4: Effect of Mobility on Upcoming Growth Rate of COVID-19 Cases.
increase).11
Then, we multiply this elasticity by the mobility-poverty elasticity estimated in the previous
section to obtain an elasticity of COVID-19 growth-rate with respect to regional poverty. Results
are reported at the bottom of Table 1, pointing to an elasticity of around 0.08. That is, a 10%
(1 standard deviation) higher rate of regional poverty is associated with a 0.8% (5%) higher
growth rate of COVID-19. To get a notion of how it translates in terms of number of cases, note
that there were 190 cumulated cases on average in the countries of our sample by March 20th
and around 22,500 cases on average by May 3 (ECDC figures). Using the estimated elasticity,
we find that a one-standard deviation difference in poverty between two regions correspond to a
difference of 11% on May 3 (around 2,500 cases) and 14% after two months. Robustness checks
confirm these orders of magnitude.12
11This elasticity is a lower bound of what is currently found in the literature. Using a different international
data (covering Asian and Western countries), Soucy et al. (2020) point to an impact of the reduction in human
mobility on the infection growth rate. They find that a 10% decrease in relative mobility in the second week of
March was associated with a 11.8% relative decrease in the average daily death growth rate in the fourth week
of March, i.e. an elasticity of 1.18.
12A two-week lag used for the growth rate calculation is the average known duration between infection and
public report. Results are similar when using 1 or 3 weeks.
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4 Conclusion
While staying at home helps to slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus, social distancing can
carry a high cost in poorer regions of the world where people typically have little savings,
low food stocks and depend heavily on casual labor to cover basic needs for survival. As a
result, poor people are more likely to show lower compliance with self-isolation requirements by
continuing daily labor activities to feed themselves and their families. Using daily mobility data
for 9 African and Latin American countries, we show that regions with higher poverty rates are
associated with a smaller decrease in work-related mobility upon the announcement of national
confinement measures in March 2020. A one standard-deviation increase in regional poverty
rate – equivalent to moving from low to high poverty regions within a country – leads to 11%
more COVID-19 cases by early May on average through the channel of higher work mobility.
Thus, lockdowns without support are significantly less likely to elicit broad compliance and can
have serious consequences for poor people. Governments in low-income countries must accom-
pany stringent lockdown policies with appropriate support in the form of combined healthcare
efforts and consumption support, either through transfers in cash if food markets are working
or in kind if they are not (Ravallion, 2020). A consideration for pursuing targeted cash transfers
to deal with COVID-19 is whether they can fit in with the delivery system of existing transfer
schemes and whether the latter have proven to be effective (Beegle et al., 2018, Gentilini, 2020).
It is also possible to rapidly scale up existing schemes through temporary modifications such as
removing work or school-attendance requirements (which run counter to the need to slow the
spread of the virus). If no effective pre-existing system is in place for household targeting, other
schemes can be considered including the use of geographical targeting based on poverty maps
and epidemiological/containment maps (McBride and Nichols, 2018).
Several research paths are suggested. First, while current policy action is monitored in real time
(Gentilini et al., 2020), future research should investigate whether social assistance provided by
governments helps to ensure a desired level of public compliance with self-isolation requirements
during pandemic. Second, even though the penetration rate of mobile phones is now high in
Latin America and Africa, as discussed above, some corrections could be brought to our mea-
sures for imputation of daily mobility changes in nationally representative surveys (Wesolowski
et al., 2012, Pokhriyal and Jacques, 2017, Steele et al., 2017, Blumenstock et al., 2015). Fi-
nally, similar methodologies could be applied to other parts of the world – in particular in India
where the human cost of lockdown may be huge given that a quarter of the population make
their major living from casual occupations (Ray et al., 2020). In this context, the expertise of
geographers using social network data could help to correlate mobility with poverty at a more
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Appendix
Country Data source / Organization, Year
Living std
measure
Moderate / extreme poverty




Permanent Household Survey (EPH)
/ National Institute of Statistics and





poverty line: 9.8/2.49 [WB:
5.5/1.9]
https://www.indec.gob.ar




Survey (PNAD Cont́ınua) / Brazilian












Integrated Household Survey (GEIH)
/ National Administrative












Household Income, Expenditure and
Consumption Survey (HIECS) /








poverty line: 6.25/4.14 [3.2/1.9]
Regional poverty calculated by




Kenya Integrated Household Budget
Survey (KIHBS), Kenya National









(Basic Report on Wellbeing in
Kenya)
Mexico
National Survey of Household Income
and Expenditure (ENIGH) /
National Council for the Evaluation












Nigeria General Household Survey







poverty line for lower middle
income country: 3.2/1.9





National Household Survey /







poverty line: 5.95/3.16 [5.5/1.9]
https://www.inei.gob.pe/
estadisticas/indice-tematico/
sociales/ (Población con al




South Africa Living Conditions







(extreme) poverty line for upper
middle income countries:
5.5/1.9




Note: Regional poverty is calculated as the headcount ratio, i.e. # of people with per capita household income/consumption, below indicated
poverty lines (moderate or extreme). The table summarizes the relevant information about data used, data providers, living standard measure
(consumption or income), poverty lines, and weblink to access the data.
*World Bank international poverty line for moderate poverty depends on the country income group (low, lower-middle or upper-middle
income countries indicated in red, green, blue respectively). When national poverty lines are used, they typically correspond to the minimum
amount covering the basic consumption basket (for extreme poverty lines: the basic food basket/nutrition requirement). In this case, we indicate
PPP values for a comparison with the WB poverty lines of the country’s income group indicated in square bracket. Note that international
poverty lines are the standard for cross-country poverty comparisons due to their simplicity (https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/
richer-array-international-poverty-lines) but are overly sensitive to measurements of PPP exchange rates and domestic consumer price
indexes, especially for countries with high inflation and a volatile exchange rate such as Argentina. Notice for Argentina the difference in poverty
line between World Bank Latin America international threshold (Ferreira et al., 2012) and the national poverty line (CEDLAS, 2017). See OECD
Economic Surveys: Argentina 2017, at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/eco surveys-arg-2017-6-en/index.html?itemId=/content/
component/eco surveys-arg-2017-6-en








(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
March 11th as Cutoff Date
Post x Poverty (bin.) 4.327*** 4.322*** 4.334*** 3.883*** 6.771*** 3.852*** 4.346***
(0.599) (0.608) (0.607) (0.590) (0.660) (0.658) (0.741)
Extreme Poverty
Post x Extreme Poverty (bin.) 3.540*** 3.555*** 3.595*** 2.298*** 6.682*** 2.150*** 1.774***
(0.522) (0.510) (0.510) (0.537) (0.595) (0.569) (0.665)
Observations 13,664 13,664 13,664 13,664 6,140 7,524 5,985
Day Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes No No No No No No
Region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cumulated COVID-19 cases No No Yes No No No No
Region reweighting No No No Yes No No No
Note: Authors’ estimation using Google reports for workplace mobility and regional poverty rates (from national statistics or authors’ esti-
mations as described in Table A1) for the period March 1-April 26, 2020. Post is a dummy indicating the period starting March 11, 2020
(WHO declaration of COVID-19 as pandemic) or March 20th, 2020 (average lockdown date) for estimation with extreme poverty. Poverty
(bin.)/Extreme poverty (bin.) is a dummy indicating whether a region’s poverty/extreme poverty rate is above country’s average. Region
reweighting: observations are weighted by (1/# of regions in the corresponding country). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1











density of mobile telephony per
100 inhabitant
National Telecommunications Agency March 2020
Colombia 129.26 # accesses per 100 inhabitants




Egypt 95.59 # accesses per 100 inhabitants
Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology
February 2020
Kenya 114.8 # SIM per 100 inhabitants Communications Authority of Kenya December 2019
Mexico 95.7
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Table A.3: Mobile Phone Penetration Rates
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Figure A.1: Work Mobility by Regional Poverty Levels (All Countries).
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